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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, housing providers-including community associa-
tions-have seen a significant increase in the number of owners and tenants
submitting "prescriptions" for emotional support and comfort animals in pet-
restricted or limited communities.' This increase-in addition to the lack of
* JoAnn Nesta Burnett, Esq., J.D., Nova Southeastern University, 1997, Magna Cum
Laude; B.A., University of South Florida, 1992. Ms. Burnett concentrates her practice in state
and federal appellate practice and procedure, complex commercial and civil litigation includ-
ing, fair housing discrimination, association litigation and general business litigation. Ms.
Burnett has represented numerous association clients in defending discrimination complaints
based upon alleged fair housing violations before local, county agencies and in state and fed-
eral court. Ms. Burnett has extensive experience in representing association clients in cove-
nant enforcement cases in arbitration and state court proceedings. Additionally, Ms. Burnett
has experience with collections and foreclosures.
** Gary A. Poliakoff, J.D., is a founding shareholder of Becker & Poliakoff, P.A. where
he served as its Managing Shareholder from inception of the firm in 1973 through March,
2008. Mr. Poliakoff is a former member of the Board of Governors of the Shepard Broad Law
Center of Nova Southeastern University where he is an Adjunct Professor, teaching Condomi-
nium Law and Practice. In 2008, Mr. Poliakoff was recognized as the outstanding Adjunct
Professor of the Year for teaching of Doctrinal Courses. He is co-author of Florida Condomi-
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case law governing how these requests should be evaluated, and the ever
increasing number of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) complaints
and unfavorable results facing associations-has, in these authors' opinions,
discouraged many associations from challenging these requests even in situa-
tions where the association is skeptical of the need for the animal. Until re-
cently, many associations believed that challenging a request for a reasonable
accommodation involving an emotional support or companion animal was a
losing battle. In 2009, an association in Florida's panhandle challenged a
unit owner's "prescription" for an emotional support animal, and the out-
come significantly changed the landscape for associations evaluating these
types of requests.
The pendulum seems to be swinging in favor of associations challeng-
ing facially illegitimate requests for reasonable accommodations, such as
emotional support or companion animals, and forcing applicants making a
request to substantiate their request with medical records and treatment
notes. 3 This decision breathes new life into an association's ability to chal-
lenge a facially illegitimate request for an emotional support animal.4 Re-
quests for reasonable accommodations involving emotional support or com-
panion animals have proven to be one of the most litigation-fraught areas of
discrimination law-and for good reason.5 While the need for many service
animals is readily apparent, such as seeing eye dogs for sight-impaired indi-
viduals, that is not the case with most requests for emotional support ani-
nium Law and Practice, The Florida Bar Continuing Legal Education, 2007, and author of a
national treatise, The Law of Condominium Operations, WEST GRouP, 1988. He co-authored,
with his son Ryan, "New Neighborhoods: The Consumer's Guide to Condominium, Co-op
and HOA Living," Emerald Book Group, 2009. He was recognized by the College of Com-
munity Association Lawyers with its highest achievement, the Gurdon Buck Award for his
contribution to the development, nationally of the field of Community Association Law, and
was designated by the Broward County commissioners and the Broward County Historical
Commission as a "Pioneer" for his contribution to the field of Community Association Law.
1. See John Ensminger & Frances Breitkopf, Service and Support Animals in Housing
Law, GPSoLo MAG. (ANIMAL LAW ISSUE), July-Aug. 2009, available at http://www.ameri
can-
bar.org/newsletter/publications/gp-solo-magazine-home/gp-solo-magazine-index/servicesup
portanimals.html.
2. See Hawn v. Shoreline Towers Phase I Condo. Ass'n, No. 3:07-cv-97/RVIEMT,
2009 WL 691378, at *1-2, 7 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 12, 2009).
3. See, e.g., id. at *7.
4. See id.
5. SARA PRATT ET AL., DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES: TESTING
GUIDANCE FOR PRACTITIONERS 1 (2005) ( "Since 1993, complaints alleging disability discrim-
ination have been the most or second most common type of fair housing complaint received
by HUD.").
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mals. 6 The majority of mental and/or psychological conditions are not visi-
ble or evident and can be difficult to confirm with a simple "prescription"
stating: "It is medically necessary for my patient, who is extremely de-
pressed, to have a dog."7 While many times HUD and its affiliated inves-
tigative agencies find this type of note sufficient to establish a need for an
emotional support animal, the federal courts properly recognized that many
owners or tenants are abusing the system by submitting "prescriptions" from
family or friend physicians, or simply by soliciting a physician to "prescribe"
an animal even though the person does not suffer from a true mental or psy-
chological disability. Therein lies the potential for improper requests by
those who simply would prefer to have an animal, compared to those who
truly require an animal as a medical necessity.8
Medical providers should not take these requests lightly; in the event of
a legal challenge, their judgment, credibility, and reputation may be ques-
tioned. Many disability rights advocates stress that fraudulent or frivolous
claims undermine the credibility of the process and ultimately insult those
whom the Fair Housing Acts were designed to protect.9 It is in everyone's
interest to maintain the integrity of this legal right.
Requests for service and emotional support animals arise out of the
1988 Amendments to the Federal Fair Housing Act, prohibiting community
associations, landlords, and other housing providers from discriminating
against residents suffering from a handicap or disability or the handicap or
disability of anyone associated with that resident.io This means associations
are required to "make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practic-
es, [and] services when . . . necessary" to provide a disabled person with
"equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling."" Compliance with the sta-
tute appears simple enough. After all, the Fair Housing Amendments Act
(FHAA) and the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) define the terms handi-
cap and disability respectively and provide guidance on what constitutes a
handicap or disability;12 but is compliance really "simple enough" for most
6. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATIONS UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING ACT 12-14 (2004).
7. See id. at 13-14.
8. See Hawn, 2009 WL 691378, at *6-7.
9. Wayne Roustan, Some Pet Owners Skirting Rules with Fake Service Dogs, SUN-
SENTINEL, Apr. 9, 2011, at Al.
10. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 6(a), 102 Stat. 1619,
1620.
I1. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (1988).
12. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006 & Supp. II 2008)); Fair Housing Amend-
ments Act of 1988 § 5(b).
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community associations, landlords, and housing providers faced with the
daunting task of determining who is handicapped and what accommodations
are reasonable and required?13 This is an extremely complex and highly fact
specific determination that perplexes even the most astute legal and medical
minds.
This article will address the legal and medical considerations of requests
for service and emotional support animals as reasonable accommodations in
pet restricted or limited communities, after providing a historical analysis of
the statutes and acts resulting in the evolution of the FHAA and its progeny.
II. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF DISABILITY/DISCRIMINATION LAW
The disability and discrimination laws trace their roots back to the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.14 This was a landmark piece of legislation in the United
States that outlawed unequal application of voter registration requirements
and racial segregation in schools, at the workplace, and by facilities that
served the general public-"public accommodations." 5 Once the Civil
Rights Act was implemented, its effects were far-reaching and had tremend-
ous long-term impacts on the whole country.1 6 It prohibited discrimination
in public facilities, in government, and in employment. 17 Thereafter, Title 8
of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, also known as the Fair Housing Act,'8 was
enacted by Congress as a means of preventing housing discrimination based
upon race, color, religion, and national origin. 9 The Act was amended in
1974 to add "sex" as a protected class.20 In 1988, Congress enacted the
21FHAA, which expanded the scope of the Act to include discrimination
13. See discussion infra Part Il.D.
14. See generally, Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241; see Teach-
ing with Documents: The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, NAT'L ARCHIVEs, http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/civil-rights-act
(last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
15. Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 101, 201-02, 401, 703.
16. See Teaching with Documents: The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission, supra note 14.
17. Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 201, 703; Teaching with Documents: The Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, supra note 14.
18. Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 801-819, 82 Stat. 73, 81-90. For
the legislative history of the FHA, see Fair Housing Act, FAIRHOUSING.COM, http://www.fair
housing.comlindex.cfm?method=page.display&pageid=655 (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
19. Civil Rights Act of 1968 H§ 801, 804 (codified at42 U.S.C. §§ 3601, 3604 (2006)).
20. Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 808(b)(l)-(4), 88 Stat. 729, 729 (1974).
21. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 1, 102 Stat. 1619,
1619.
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based upon "familial status" and "handicap." 22 The FHAA requires that
shared ownership housing communities "make reasonable accommodations
in rules, policies, practices, or services," and allow "reasonable modifications
of existing premises . .. to afford . .. [handicapped individuals] full [use and]
enjoyment of the premises."23
On the heels of the FHAA, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
was signed into law by President Bush on July 26, 1990.24 The ADA is a
comprehensive formulation of the rights of handicapped individuals in the
United States, the purpose of which is:
1) [T]o provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for
the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabili-
ties;
2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards ad-
dressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
3) to ensure that the [flederal [glovernment plays a central role in
enforcing the standards established in this [chapter] on behalf of
individuals with disabilities; and
4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the
power to enforce the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment and to regulate
commerce, in order to address the major areas of discrimination
faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.25
The ADA is designed to prevent discrimination in public accommoda-
tions, commercial facilities, employment, state and local government servic-
es, transportation, and telecommunications,26 while the FHAA is designed to
prevent discrimination in housing. Although the two Acts serve different
purposes, they both seek to redress discrimination based upon disability or
handicap.28 The FHAA uses the term "handicap" 29 while the ADA uses the
22. Id. § 5(a)-(b).
23. Id. § 6(a).
24. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 1, 104 Stat. 327,
327; 3 BERNARD D. REAMS, JR. ET AL., DISABILITY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES: A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 PUBLIC LAW 101-
336 vii (1992). For a history of the ADA, see generally REAMS, JR. ET AL., supra.
25. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 2(b).
26. Id. § 2(a)-(b).
27. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 § 6(a).
28. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 2(b)(1); Fair Housing Amendments
Act of 1988 § 6(a).
2012] 455
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term "disability."30 Both terms have the same legal meaning 3' and both Acts
use the same or similar provisions and definitions, but the ADA has been
litigated far more than the FHAA. 32 Accordingly, the body of case law ad-
dressing the ADA is more expansive than that addressing the FHAA. 33 Fed-
eral courts began addressing FHAA cases and issues by referring to ADA
employment discrimination doctrines. 34 "The almost universal application of
the two Acts lends itself to similarities in interpretation; the very broadness
of their scope virtually necessitates doctrinal equivalence in order to ensure
some degree of consistency in the law."3 The Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals explained that although the Acts "create and protect distinct rights,
their similarities have traditionally facilitated the development of common or
parallel methods of proof when appropriate." 36 Accordingly, while focusing
on the FHAA and requests for emotional support animals, there will be cites
to ADA and employment cases within this article.
Having noted the similarities in the Acts, it is important to understand
that the Acts are beginning to take separate and divergent paths. On Sep-
tember 25, 2008, the ADAAA was signed into law, effective, January 1,
29. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 § 5(b).
30. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 3.
31. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998) (noting that definition of "disabili-
ty" in the Americans with Disabilities Act "is drawn almost verbatim from . . . the definition
of 'handicap' contained in the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988").
32. See, e.g., United States v. Cal. Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 29 F.3d 1413, 1417-18
(9th Cir. 1994); City of Edmonds v. Wash. State Bldg. Code Council, 18 F.3d 802, 806 (9th
Cir. 1994) ("Reasonable accommodation is borrowed from case law interpreting the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973."). Since the enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act, we have
relied on ADA cases in applying the FHAA, because, as a general matter, "there is no signifi-
cant difference in the analysis of rights and obligations created by the two Acts." Vinson v.
Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1152 n.7 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted); see also Bragdon, 524
U.S. at 631 ("The ADA's definition of disability is drawn almost verbatim from the defini-
tion[s] ... in the Rehabilitation Act . . . [and] the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988");
Reg'1 Econ. Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v. City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 46 (2d Cir.
2002); Ryan v. Ramsey, 936 F. Supp. 417, 422 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (relying on ADA precedent
in finding HIV as a disability in an FHA case).
33. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 628; City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725,
728 n.1 (1995); Vinson, 288 F.3d at 1148, 1155; Cal. Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 29 F.3d
at 1414-16; Ryan, 936 F. Supp. at 422.
34. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 629; Vinson, 288 F.3d at 1154; Ryan, 936 F. Supp. at 421.
But see City of Edmonds, 514 U.S. at 728; Cal. Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 29 F.3d at
1416.
35. Edward G. Kramer et al., Causes of Action for Handicapped Discrimination in Hous-
ing in Violation of the Federal Fair Housing Act [42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3601 et seq.] and Related
Federal Statutes, in 22 CAUSES OF ACnON § 8 (2d ed. 2012), available at Westlaw.
36. Pinchback v. Armistead Homes Corp., 907 F.2d 1447, 1451 (4th Cir. 1990).
[Vol. 36456
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2009.37 The ADA's definition of "disability" was the same three-pronged
definition found in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the definition current-
ly found in the FHAA." The proponents of the ADAAA believed the courts
had "narrow[ed] the definition of disability in unexpected ways."39 The
ADAAA was enacted to "provid[e] 'a clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination' and 'clear, strong, consistent,
enforceable standards addressing discrimination' by reinstating a broad
scope of protection to be available under the ADA."4 0 Accordingly, the
ADAAA was revised with the intent to lessen the standards for proving dis-
abilities.4' Since this article focuses on whether an association can or should
grant a reasonable accommodation to its pet restrictions and/or limitations
with regard to emotional support animals, the differences between the FHAA
and ADAAA affecting emotional support-and service-animals will be
discussed below.
III. THE LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS IMPLICATED BY THE FHAA
The FHAA is found in section 3601, et seq of Title 42 of the United
States Code, and every state has adopted an identical or virtually identical
version of the FHAA. 42 In addition to prohibiting discrimination in the sale
or rental of a dwelling based upon race, color, religion, sex, familial status,
and national origin, it is also unlawful
[t]o discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make un-
available or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a
handicap of [the] buyer or renter, [or the handicap of someone] in-
tending to reside in that dwelling . . . or [the handicap of someone]
associated with [the] buyer or renter.43
This includes a "refus[al] to make reasonable accommodations in rules, poli-
cies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to
37. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); see 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h)(l)-(3)
(2006); see also Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 631.
39. Jacquie Brennan, The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, SOUTHWEST ADA CTR., 7
(2008), http://www.post-polio.org/edu/pphnews/PPH24-4fa08p7.pdf.
40. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(1), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006 & Supp. II 2008)).
41. See id. at § 2(a)(4)-(8).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2006); see Rebecca F. Wisch, Table of State Assistance Animal
laws, ANIMAL LEGAL & HIsT. CTR, http://animallaw.info/articles/ddusassistanceanimaltable.
htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1).
2012] 457
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afford [such] person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling."" It is
an established principle of law that a reasonable accommodation to an asso-
ciation's pet restriction or limitation must be granted to a disabled individual
requiring a service and/or emotional support animal.4 5 In other words, grant-
ing an accommodation to allow a person who is disabled to have an emotion-
al support animal is considered "reasonable" as a matter of law. 46
A. Who or What Does the FHAA Govern?
The FHAA applies to condominium and homeowners' associations
alike, unless they fall within an express exemption.47 The Joint Statement of
the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Department of
Justice, dated May 17, 2004, explains that the FHAA applies to condomi-
nium and homeowners' associations. 48 The exact power is derived from sec-
tion 3602(d), which defines a "person" to include "one or more individuals,
corporations, partnerships, associations, labor organizations, legal repre-
sentatives, mutual companies, joint-stock companies, trusts, unincorporated
organizations, trustees, trustees in cases under [T]itle 11, receivers, and fidu-
ciaries."49
The Joint Statement provides:
Any person or entity engaging in prohibited conduct-i.e., re-
fusing to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, prac-
tices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to
afford a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and
enjoy a dwelling-may be held liable unless they fall within an
exception to the Act's coverage. Courts have applied the Act to
individuals, corporations, associations and others involved in the
provision of housing and residential lending, including property
owners, housing managers, homeowners and condominium associ-
ations, lenders, real estate agents, and brokerage services. Courts
have also applied the Act to state and local governments, most of-
ten in the context of exclusionary zoning or other land-use deci-
sions. Under specific exceptions to the Fair Housing Act, the rea-
sonable accommodation requirements of the Act do not apply to a
44. 24 C.F.R. § 100.204(a) (2011).
45. See Rebecca J. Huss, No Pets Allowed: Housing Issues and Companion Animals, 11
ANIMALL. 69,74 (2005).
46. See id.
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV.,
supra note 6, at 3.
48. U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE & U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEv., supra note 6, at 1, 3.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(d).
[Vol. 36458
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private individual owner who sells his own home so long as he (1)
does not own more than three single-family homes; (2) does not
use a real estate agent and does not employ any discriminatory ad-
vertising or notices; (3) has not engaged in a similar sale of a home
within a 24-month period; and (4) is not in the business of selling
or renting dwellings. The reasonable accommodation require-
ments of the Fair Housing Act also do not apply to owner-
occupied buildings that have four or fewer dwelling units.50
Accordingly, condominium and homeowners' associations are governed
by the FHAA, and therefore, are subject to discrimination claims based upon
an alleged violation of the FHAA arising out of an owner's, tenant's, guest's
and/or associated person's disability.5
B. Who Does the FHAA Protect?
The FHAA is designed to protect owners, applicants or residents from
discriminatory practices "because of their disability or the disability of any-
one associated with them," and to prevent housing providers "from treating
persons with disabilities less favorably than others because of their disabili-
ty."52 The Act also makes it unlawful for any person to refuse "to make rea-
sonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such
accommodations may be necessary to afford [a disabled individual or some-
one associated with a disabled person an] equal opportunity to use and enjoy
a dwelling."53 "The Act also prohibits housing providers from refusing resi-
dency to persons with disabilities, or placing conditions on their residency,
because those persons may require reasonable accommodations."54
C. What Is a Disability or Handicap Under the FHAA?
The term "handicap" is defined in the FHAA as:
1) a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one
or more of such person's major life activities; 2) a record of having
such an impairment; or 3) being regarded as having such an im-
50. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., supra note 6, at 3
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
51. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3602(d), 3604(0(1).
52. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEv., supra note 6, at 2
(footnote omitted); see 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601, 3604(f)(1-(3).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B).
54. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEv., supra note 6, at 2.
2012] 459
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pairment, but such term does not include current, illegal use of or
addiction to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of
[Tlitle 21)."
The definition of "handicap" is further clarified in the Code of Federal Regu-
lations, which provides:
Handicap means, with respect to a person, a physical or men-
tal impairment which substantially limits one or more major life
activities; a record of such an impairment; or being regarded as
having such an impairment. This term does not include current, il-
legal use of or addiction to a controlled substance. For purposes of
this part, an individual shall not be considered to have a handicap
solely because that individual is a transvestite. As used in this de-
finition:
(a) Physical or mental impairment [as to prong (1) above] in-
cludes:
(1) Any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigure-
ment, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following
body systems: Neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense or-
gans; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; repro-
ductive; digestive; genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and
endocrine; or
(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retarda-
tion, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and spe-
cific learning disabilities. The term physical or mental impairment
includes, but is not limited to, such diseases and conditions as or-
thopedic, visual, speech and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy,
autism, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer,
heart disease, diabetes, Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection,
mental retardation, emotional illness, drug addiction (other than
addiction caused by current, illegal use of a controlled substance)
and alcoholism.
(c) Has a record of such an impairment [as to prong (2) above]
means has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a men-
55. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h).
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tal or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more
major life activities.
(d) Is regarded as having an impairment means [as to prong (3)
above]:
(1) Has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially
limit one or more major life activities but that is treated by another
person as constituting such a limitation;
(2) Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of
other toward such impairment; or
(3) Has none of the impairments defined in paragraph (a) of this
definition but is treated by another person as having such an im-
pairment.56
The following conditions are generally not considered impairments:
"environmental, cultural, and economic disadvantages, homosexuality and
bisexuality, pregnancy, physical characteristics, common personality traits,
[and] normal deviations in height, weight, or strength."
The ADAAA maintained the same three-prong definition of disability;
however, it clarified that the term disability should be construed to provide
broad coverage, as follows:
4) Rules of construction regarding the definition of disability.
The definition of 'disability' in paragraph (1) shall be construed in
accordance with the following:
(A) The definition of disability in this Act shall be construed in fa-
vor of broad coverage of individuals under this Act, to the maxi-
mum extent permitted by the terms of this Act.58
56. 24 C.F.R. § 100.201 (2011) (emphasis omitted).
57. Executive Summary: Compliance Manual Section 902, Definition of the Term "Dis-
ability", EEOC COMPL. MAN., http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/902sum.htmi (last modified
Mar. 5, 2009).
58. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006 & Supp. II 2008)).
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In these authors' opinions, the courts interpreting the FHAA, HUD and
its investigative agencies have been applying this broad definition of disabili-
ty in the FHAA context.
D. What is Necessary to Establish a Disability?
Many physical impairments are visible and therefore, easily identified
without the need for further medical support.59 For example, someone who
is confined to a wheelchair, or who has lost a limb, or who is blind, can be
visually identified as having a "physical impairment."" If the impairment is
obvious and the nexus between the impairment and the requested service or
support animal is also obvious, no additional documentation should be re-
quested." However, someone who claims a physical or mental impairment
that is not visually apparent-such as diabetes, high-blood pressure, heart
disease, anxiety, depression, panic disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder,
or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder-will most likely be asked to pro-
vide medical support and documentation to establish that a disability exists. 62
The non-visual disabilities pose the greatest challenges for associations
and housing providers alike. 63 How is a board of voluntary officers and di-
rectors, the majority of which have no legal or medical training, supposed to
determine if a person is disabled as a matter of law? Is there a checklist?
Are there guidelines?
The short answer is, no. The long answer is the association's board
must attempt to determine if the requesting party's alleged disability "sub-
stantially limits one or more [of the person's] major life activities."64 Major
life activities are defined in the Code of Federal Regulations as, "functions
such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hear-
59. U.S. DEP'TOFJUSTICE& U.S. DEP'TOFHous. & URBAN DEv., supra note 6, at 12-13.
60. Id. at 13.
61. Id. at 12-13; see also Gary Poliakoff & JoAnn Nesta Burnett, Prescription Pets:
Homeowners Are Increasingly Bringing Doctors' Notes as They Seek Waivers of Their Asso-
ciations' No-Pet Rules. When Is a Pet a Medical Necessity Under the Lw?, BECKER &
POLIAKOFF 2 (2008), http://www.becker-poliakoff.com/pubs/articles/poliakoff g/poliakoff
prescription-pets.pdf (explaining in detail the type of documentation an association is able to
request when an impairment is obvious and the need for a service/support animal is also ob-
vious, differing from when the nexus between the impairment and the requested animal is not
obvious, meaning the impairment and nexus cannot be ascertained from a purely visual stand-
point).
62. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., supra note 6, at 13-14;
Poliakoff & Burnett, supra note 61, at 2.
63. See, e.g., Green v. Hous. Auth. of Clackamas Cnty., 994 F. Supp. 1253, 1254-55 (D.
Or. 1998).
64. 24 C.F.R. § 100.201 (2011).
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ing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.""6 Of course, this list is not
exhaustive.' What qualifies as a major life activity in one situation, may not
qualify in another. If determining what constitutes a major life activity was
not difficult enough, the association's board members must then determine if
the alleged disability "substantially limits one or more [of a person's] major
",67life activities.
The ADAAA revised the definition of major life activities to include:
(2) Major life activities.
(A) In general.-For purposes of paragraph (1), major life ac-
tivities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, perform-
ing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, stand-
ing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, con-
centrating, thinking, communicating, and working.
(B) Major bodily functions.-For purposes of paragraph (1), a
major life activity also includes the operation of a major bodily
function, including but not limited to, functions of the immune
system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurologi-
cal, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive
functions. 68
Although this definition provides greater detail about what constitutes a
major life activity, the fact of the matter is, these changes appear to codify
case law that already existed, and that was previously applied in FHAA cas-
es. 69
"The term 'substantially limits' suggests that the limitation is 'signifi-
cant' or 'to a large degree."' 70 The term "substantially limits" is not defined
in the FHAA, but is defined and explained in the ADA and case law, to
mean:
65. Id. § 100.201(b) (defining "major life activities").
66. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 639 (1998) (finding reproduction to be a
major life activity under the ADA).
67. 24 C.F.R. § 100.201.
68. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006 & Supp. II 2008)).
69. See, e.g., Green v. Hous. Auth. of Clackamas Cnty., 994 F. Supp. 1253, 1254-55 (D.
Or. 1998) (showing how it is undeniable that partial deafness impacts the major bodily func-
tion of hearing).
70. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEv., supra note 6, at 4.
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(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person
in the general population can perform; or
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration
under which an individual can perform a particular major life ac-
tivity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under
which the average person in the general population can perform
that same major life activity.71
An impairment is generally considered substantially limiting if it prohi-
bits or significantly restricts an individual's ability "to perform a major life
activity" as compared to the ability of "the average person in the general
population [to] perform" the same activity. 72 Determining whether an im-
pairment substantially limits a major life activity is dependent on: "1) the
nature and severity of the impairment; 2) the duration or expected duration of
the impairment; and 3) the permanent or long-term impact of or resulting
from the impairment." 73 "Although very short-term, temporary restrictions
generally are not substantially limiting, an impairment does not have to be
permanent to rise to the level of a disability;" but, the expected duration of
the impairment is a factor to be considered.7 4 "Temporary impairments that
take significantly longer than normal to heal"-for example, surgeries result-
ing in unexpected infections, "long-term impairments, or potentially long-
term impairments of indefinite duration may be disabilities if they are se-
vere."75 "Chronic or episodic disorders, [such as anxiety and depression] that
are substantially limiting when active or have a high likelihood of recurrence
in substantially limiting forms may be disabilities." 76 "An individual who
has two or more impairments that are not substantially limiting by them-
71. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) (2010); see Cato v. First Fed. Cmty. Bank, 668 F. Supp. 2d
933, 941 (E.D. Tex. 2009).
72. Cato, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 941 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)).
73. Id. (quoting EEOC v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., 570 F.3d 606, 615 (5th Cir.
2009)); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(i)-(iii) (internal quotation marks omitted).
74. Executive Summary: Compliance Manual Section 902, Definition of the Term "Dis-
ability", supra note 57; see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(ii).
75. Executive Summary: Compliance Manual Section 902, Definition of the Term "Dis-
ability", supra note 57; see Cato, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 941; see also Chevron Phillips Chem.
Co., 570 F.3d at 618.
76. Executive Summary: Compliance Manual Section 902, Definition of the Term "Dis-
ability", supra note 57; see ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4(a), 122
Stat. 3553, 3555 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006 & Supp. 112008)).
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selves, but [in conjunction] substantially limit one or more [of a person's]
major life activities," is considered disabled.77
The definitions above come from the ADA7' and the case law interpret-
ing the term "substantially limits." 79  However, section 12102 of the
ADAAA lessens the standard by stating:
(4)(B) The term "substantially limits" shall be interpreted consis-
tently with the findings and purposes of the ADA Amendments
Act of 2008.
(C) An impairment that substantially limits one major life activity
need not limit other major life activities in order to be considered a
disability.
(D) An impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if
it would substantially limit a major life activity when active.
(E)(i) The determination of whether an impairment substantially
limits a major life activity shall be made without regard to the
ameliorative effects of mitigating measures such as-
(I) medication, medical supplies, equipment, or appliances,
low-vision devices (which do not include ordinary eyeglasses or
contact lenses), prosthetics including limbs and devices, hearing
aids and cochlear implants or other implantable hearing devices,
mobility devices, or oxygen therapy equipment and supplies;
(II) use of assistive technology;
(111) reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids or services;
or
(IV) learned behavioral or adaptive neurological modifica-
tions.8
77. Executive Summary: Compliance Manual Section 902, Definition of the Term "Dis-
ability", supra note 57; see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(i)(A) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
79. See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 195-97 (2002),
abrogated as stated in Gonzalez v. Ill. State Toll Highway Auth., No. 0804470, 2010 WL
3731453 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14,2010).
80. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 4(a).
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It is unknown if the ADAAA definition above will be applied, and if so,
to what extent, in FHAA cases. Notwithstanding the fact that this definition
is not contained in the FHAA, HUD has been applying these standards in its
investigation of discrimination complaints for quite some time."
Armed with this extensive knowledge and guidance, an association's
board members should be able to apply these definitions and determine
whether a person is disabled, right? To some extent that is true, but for the
most part each request must be decided on a case-by-case basis." As the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals succinctly explained, not every impairment
qualifies as a disability protected by the FHAA because not every impair-
ment is substantially limiting.83 The court described the proper disability
determination to be:
A disability determination, however, should not be based on ab-
stract lists or categories of impairments, as there are varying de-
grees of impairments as well as varied individuals who suffer from
the impairments. In fact, the regulations note that a finding of dis-
ability: "is not necessarily based on the name or diagnosis of the
impairment the person has, but rather on the effect of that impair-
ment on the life of the individual. Some impairments may be dis-
abling for particular individuals but not for others, depending upon
the stage of the disease or disorder, the presence of other impair-
ments that combine to make the impairment disabling or any num-
ber of other factors." This is why a determination of disability
must be made on an individualized, case-by-case basis. Whether a
substantial limitation upon a major life activity exists depends
upon an analysis of 1) the nature and severity of the impairment, 2)
the duration of the impairment, and 3) the permanent or long-term
impact of the impairment.84
The effect of a particular impairment on several peoples' lives may vary
greatly. Accordingly, a particular impairment might constitute a disability in
one case and not in another.
81. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 5, 102 Stat. 1619,
1620; see Kramer et al., supra note 35.
82. Homeyer v. Stanley Tulchin Assocs., 91 F.3d 959, 962 (7th Cir. 1996).
83. Id.
84. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j) (2010)).
85. Id.
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IV. THE MEDICAL DOCUMENTATION NECESSARY TO SUBSTANTIATE A
DISABILITY AND NEED FOR AN EMOTIONAL SUPPORT ANIMAL
As referenced above, there are certain criteria HUD and its investigative
agencies apply to discrimination claims concerning the type of documenta-
tion an association can or should request to support a person's claimed disa-
bility and need for an emotional support animal. When the disability and
nexus are obvious, there is no need for additional information. However,
when neither the disability nor the nexus between the requested accommoda-
tion are obvious, HUD provides that an association may request the follow-
ing:
A housing provider may not ordinarily inquire as to the nature
and severity of an individual's disability .... However, in re-
sponse to a request for a reasonable accommodation, a housing
provider may request reliable disability-related information that (1)
is necessary to verify that the person meets the Act's definition of
disability (i.e., has a physical or mental impairment that substan-
tially limits one or more major life activities), (2) describes the
needed accommodation, and (3) shows the relationship between
the person's disability and the need for the requested accommoda-
tion. Depending on the individual's circumstances, information
verifying that the person meets the Act's definition of disability
can usually be provided by the individual himself or herself (e.g.,
proof that an individual under [sixty-five] years of age receives
Supplemental Security Income or Social Security Disability Insur-
ance benefits or a credible statement by the individual). A doctor
or other medical professional, a peer support group, a non-medical
service agency, or a reliable third party who is in a position to
know about the individual's disability may also provide verifica-
tion of a disability. In most cases, an individual's medical records
or detailed information about the nature of a person's disability is
not necessary for this inquiry.
Once a housing provider has established that a person meets
the Act's definition of disability, the provider's request for docu-
mentation should seek only the information that is necessary to
evaluate if the reasonable accommodation is needed because of a
disability. Such information must be kept confidential and must
not be shared with other persons unless they need the information
86. See supra Part III.D.
87. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEv., supra note 6,
at 12-13.
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to make or assess a decision to grant or deny a reasonable accom-
modation request or unless disclosure is required by law (e.g., a
court-issued subpoena requiring disclosure).
How should an association respond to a person who submits a letter
from an out-of-state physician who specializes in treating pediatric patients
and who shares the same name as the requesting party, but whose documen-
tation is otherwise facially compliant with the FHAA? Under HUD's guide-
lines, the association should simply approve the request and ignore any skep-
ticism the board might have.89 Meanwhile, the condominium owner making
the request has submitted a note from her son who is a pediatrician and has
written a letter stating that his patient suffers from severe mental impair-
ments that require an emotional support animal. 90 While this may seem to be
an extreme situation, unfortunately it is not; it occurs every day. 91 These
authors have encountered several situations in which a requesting party has a
friend or family member physician write a "prescription" for an emotional
support animal, knowing full well that the requesting party does not suffer
from a disability or handicap. HUD and its investigative agencies frightened
most associations from challenging even the most egregious violations-
until recently, that is.92
In 2009, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Florida addressed the issue of whether an association is able to request addi-
tional medical information where the board is skeptical of the request made
and/or the documentation supplied.93 The Hawn v. Shoreline Towers Phase I
Condominium Ass'n 94 case involved a unit owner in a pet restricted commu-
nity who brought suit against an association (the Association) for alleged
violations of the state and federal Fair Housing Acts and various other re-
lated causes of action arising out of the Association's denial of Hawn's re-
quest for an emotional support animal.95 Hawn purchased a unit in the Asso-
ciation in 2004 with full knowledge that this was a pet restricted communi-
88. Id. at 13-14 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
89. See id.
90. See HOA Pet Rules & Required Accommodations: The Facts About Comfort Ani-
mals, HOALEADER.COM (July 2009), http://www.hoaleader.com/public/306.cfm.
91. See id.
92. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEv., supra note 6, at
14-15; Hawn v. Shoreline Towers Phase I Condo. Ass'n, No. 3:07-cv-97/RV/EMT, 2009 WL
691378, at *7 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 12, 2009).
93. Hawn, 2009 WL 691378, at *2.
94. No. 3:07-cv-97/RV/EMT, 2009 WL 691378 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 12, 2009).
95. Id.at*1-2.
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ty.96 In January 2005, about a year after moving in, Hawn wrote to the board
and requested that the Association amend the restriction prohibiting pets to
allow owners to maintain pets and more specifically, to allow Hawn to keep
a pet.97 The letter did not state that Hawn was disabled, but instead, stated
the dog was his close companion. It is unclear what action the board took,
but in June 2006, Hawn wrote another letter to the board-for the first time
claiming a disability and a need for a "service and support animal" due to his
physical and mental disabilities. 99 In support of his request for a reasonable
accommodation to maintain a service/emotional support animal, Hawn pro-
vided the Shoreline Board of Directors with two letters-one from a psy-
chologist and one from a chiropractor.'" The psychologist's letter provided
that "the plaintiff suffered from severe panic attacks; was unable to properly
cope with anxiety and stress; and was particularly vulnerable 'while residing
at his home/condo due to past occurrences on that property."'"o' The psy-
chologist stated that he was "prescribing a service animal" to "help plaintiff
cope with his 'emotionally crippling disability.' 1 02 Additionally, Hawn's
chiropractor submitted a letter in support of Hawn's physical disability stat-
ing that he was "'intimately familiar' with [Hawn's] history and the 'func-
tional limitations imposed by his disability."'l 03 He stated that a "[service]
animal would 'assist Mr. Hawn with his disability.'"'" The letter did not
provide what specific limitations existed.'05
The Association requested additional information "including documen-
tation to support [Hawn's] alleged disabilities and the qualifications of' the
authors of the letters.'" Hawn did not respond because he felt his letters
were sufficient.'07 The board again requested additional information includ-
ing:
[Elxpert evidence under oath of the nature of [Hawn's] impair-
ment, the manner in which it substantially limitfed] one or more of
[Hawn's] major life functions or activities, how the requested [an-
96. Id. at *1.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Hawn, 2009 WL 691378, at *1.
100. Id. at *1-2.
101. Id. at *2.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Hawn, 2009 WL 691378, at *2.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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imal] [was] necessary to afford [Hawn] an equal opportunity to use
and enjoy [his] dwelling and if there [were] other corrective meas-
ures which [would] permit such use and enjoyment. 108
Again Hawn failed to respond and instead, filed a complaint with the
Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR).'" The FCHR determined
that "there was cause to believe that the [Association] discriminated against"
Hawn in failing to grant the request for a reasonable accommodation." 0
Hawn then filed suit. 11
In disagreeing with FCHR, and in granting summary judgment for the
Association, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Florida explained that "[w]hether a requested accommodation is required by
law is highly fact-specific, requiring case-by-case determination."ll 2 The
court found that Hawn was unable to establish that he was disabled or that
the Association discriminated against him under the Fair Housing Acts be-
cause he could not establish that the Association knew or should have known
of his alleged disability or that the Association knew an "accommodation
was necessary to afford him [an] equal opportunity to use and enjoy [his]
dwelling.""'
The court explained that given the fact that Hawn lobbied for a change
in the no pet restriction without ever mentioning a disability despite the fact
that the alleged disabilities were diagnosed prior to Hawn's first letter,
coupled with the fact that shortly after the failure to amend the restriction
occurred, Hawn had his dog trained as a service animal and for the first time
claimed a disability, "it [was] understandable that the board was suspicious
of his disability claim."" 4 Further, had Hawn actually provided the addition-
al medical information that was requested, the court believed the Association
would have been justified in denying his request because the treatment histo-
ry revealed that the psychiatrist saw Hawn for only two one-hour sessions
and the chiropractor had not seen Hawn in nearly seven years.'1 Further,
Hawn solicited the letters which he essentially drafted for their signature." 6
"In order to show that the disabled person needs the assistance of a service
108. Id.
109. Hawn, 2009 WL 691378, at *2.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at *4 (quoting Loren ex rel. Aguirre v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1302 (11th Cir.
2002) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
113. Id. at *5-6 (emphasis omitted).
114. Hawn, 2009 WL 691378, at *4.
115. Id. at *4 n.6.
116. See id.
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animal ... it is reasonable to require the opinion of a physician who is know-
ledgeable about the subject disability and the manner in which a service dog
can ameliorate the effects of the disability." "' The letters submitted did not
provide that information and the Association was entitled to that additional
medical information to make a proper determination."' 8 The court explained
that Hawn's refusal to provide any additional medical information, in addi-
tion to the suspicious grounds surrounding his request, prevented any finding
of improper conduct on the part of the Association.11 9
Hawn then appealed the case to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
which affirmed the trial court's opinion, stating:
We are similarly unpersuaded by Hawn's argument that the district
court erred by failing to consider the documentation made availa-
ble to Shoreline during the course of the FCHR investigation.
First, the district court did in fact consider such evidence; it noted
in its order that Hawn's doctors completed "Medical Certification
Forms," in which they "opined that plaintiff had a disability and
that a service dog was necessary." Second, a review of the Medi-
cal Certification Forms reveals that they lack much of the informa-
tion requested by Shoreline. The Medical Certification Forms ap-
pear to be generic forms obtained from the FCHR that merely re-
quired Hawn's doctors to check "yes" and "no" boxes and, in
some spaces, provided blank lines for brief comments. The forms
did not ask for-and the doctors did not provide-other informa-
tion requested by Shoreline, such as Hawn's doctors' credentials.
Third, aside from the documents addressed by the district court, it
is unclear what other evidence was presented to the FCHR and
made available to Shoreline. The Medical Certification Forms
were the only documents attached to Hawn's response to Shore-
line's motion for summary judgment that appear to have been
created during the pendency of the FCHR investigation. Finally,
the FCHR's opinion, in which it found cause to believe that Shore-
line had discriminated against Hawn, relies predominantly, if not
exclusively, on evidence predating the filing of the FCHR com-
plaint. It is therefore unclear what additional evidence Hawn be-
lieves was presented to Shoreline during the FCHR investigation
117. Id. at *7 (quoting Prindable v. Ass'n of Apartment Owners of 2987 Kalakaua, 304 F.
Supp. 2d 1245, 1259 (D. Haw. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
118. Id. See Porter v. Imperial Embassy Condo. Four, Inc., No. 11-48302012, 2012 WL
1451560, (Fla. Div. Admin Hrgs Mar. 2012).
119. See Hawn, 2009 WL 691378, at *7.
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that put Shoreline on notice of Hawn's disability and the necessity
of a service animal. 120
To prevail on a discrimination claim,
the plaintiff must establish: 1) that he is disabled or handicapped
within the meaning of the FHA, and that the defendants knew or
should have known of that fact; 2) that the defendants knew that an
accommodation was necessary to afford him equal opportunity to
use and enjoy the dwelling; 3) that such an accommodation is rea-
sonable; and 4) that the defendant refused to make the requested
accommodation. 121
Hawn was unable to satisfy the first and second prongs stated above,
and was therefore, unable to prove a claim of discrimination.122 The court
further explained that it was significant that the Association did not outright
deny Hawn's request, but instead, it attempted to engage in an interactive
process and request additional information.123 The Association attempted to
conduct a meaningful investigation of Hawn's claims but his refusal to pro-
vide any additional information resulted in the Association's denial of his
request.124
In the case of United States v. Hialeah Housing Authority,125 the Ele-
venth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the southern district's
entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Hialeah Housing Au-
thority (HHA), on plaintiffs (on behalf of Miguel Rodriguez) FHA/disability
discrimination claims.126  The Rodriguez family was a tenant of HHA-
120. Hawn v. Shoreline Towers Phase 1 Condo. Ass'n, 347 F. App'x 464, 468 (lth Cir.
2009) (per curiam).
121. Hawn, 2009 WL 691378, at *4 (citing Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d
1201, 1218-19 (11 th Cir. 2008); United States v. Cal. Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 107
F.3d 1374, 1380 (9th Cir. 1997); Jacobs v. Concord Vill. Condo. X Ass'n, 17 Fla. L. Weekly
D347, D347 (S.D. Feb. 17, 2004)).
122. See Hawn, 347 F. App'x at 468.
123. Hawn, 2009 WL 691378, at *6-7. See Sun Harbor Homeowners' Assoc., Inc. v.
Bonura, No. 4DIO-3038, 2012 WL 2120923, *6 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. June 13, 2012) (ex-
plaining that homeowner and his fiancde failed to demonstrate that they requested an accom-
modation and therefore, discrimination claim failed; Further, association never denied the
request); Meadowland Apartments v. Schumacher, 813 N.W.2d 618, 624-26 (S.D. 2012)
(finding no discrimination where no action was taken to remove the animal or the tenant pend-
ing the outcome of the litigation to determine if tenant was truly disabled).
124. Hawn, 2009 WL 691378, at *6-7..
125. 418 F. App'x 872 (11 th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
126. Id. at 878.
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Project 16.127 HHA also provided housing to the Amparo and Perez families,
who were neighbors of the Rodriguez family.128 There were several alterca-
tions between the families and HHA attempted to terminate the tenancies of
all three families because it could not resolve or otherwise prevent the alter-
cations. 129 Mr. Rodriguez was served with a thirty-day notice of termination
of tenancy and the family requested an informal hearing to contest the termi-
nation. 13 0 HHA appointed a hearing officer to preside over the proceed-
ings.131
At the hearing, Mr. Rodriguez provided the hearing officer with "docu-
ments showing that [he] was sick."1 3 2 Mr. Rodriguez and his wife advised
the hearing officer that Mr. Rodriguez "had difficulty climbing stairs" and
"needed a unit with a bathroom" on the ground floor.13' HHA offered to
transfer the Rodriguez family to a unit in another project that had a bathroom
upstairs and downstairs.134 The Rodriguez family claimed they were not able
to inspect the unit prior to accepting the transfer agreement, but based on the
representation that there was a downstairs bathroom, Mr. Rodriguez agreed
to relocate to the other housing project and executed a transfer agreement
accepting the new unit.13 5
Upon inspecting the unit, the Rodriguez family wrote a letter to the
hearing officer challenging the transfer because the proposed apartment was
dirty, had no air conditioning, and had no bathroom downstairs.136 The note
stated that Mr. Rodriguez and his wife had surgery and they were unable to
climb stairs every time they needed to use the bathroom.13 7 The hearing of-
ficer responded with a letter stating the decision to terminate was upheld.138
HHA responded by terminating the tenancy and eventually filing an eviction
action.139 In his answer, Mr. Rodriguez asserted that he was "disabled due to
hip and back problems and that he could not constantly go up and down
127. United States v. Hialeah Hous. Auth., No. 08-22679-CIV, 2010 WL 1540046, at *1
& n.4 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 2010), rev'd per curiam, 418 F. App'x 872 (11 th Cir. 2011).
128. Id. at *L
129. Id.
130. Id. at *2.
131. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
132. United States v. Hialeah Hous. Auth., 418 F. App'x 872, 874 (11th Cir. 2011) (per
curiam) (alteration in original).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.; Hialeah Hous. Auth., 2010 WL 1540046, at *2.
137. Hialeah Hous. Auth., 418 F. App'x at 874.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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stairs to use [the] bathroom."'40 The parties mediated the eviction claim at
which time, counsel for Rodriguez advised HHA "that Mr. Rodriguez had a
disability that prevented him from going up and down stairs" and that was
the sole reason for rejecting the transfer. 14 ' HHA contended it requested do-
cumentation substantiating the disability.142 It claimed that it had first
learned of the alleged disability at mediation; however, HHA would not al-
low the family to remain in the Project 16 unit and instead, offered the same
unit at the other project with the caveat that the family would be placed on a
waiting list for a suitable unit.143 The Rodriguez family rejected this offer,
and instead, the parties entered into an agreement whereby the family would
"vacate the Project 16 unit by August 31, 2005."'"
Mr. Rodriguez filed a HUD complaint alleging HHA discriminated
against him and his family based upon his disability.145 HUD found cause to
believe discrimination had occurred.'" The United States filed suit against
HHA on behalf of Mr. Rodriguez in the Southern District of Florida.147 The
trial court entered summary judgment in favor of HHA finding that "no rea-
sonable jury could conclude that [HHA] knew or should have known Mr.
Rodriguez was disabled and . . . the requested accommodation was neces-
sary."l 48
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded because there
were genuine issues of material fact concerning whether HHA had notice of
the disability and the requested accommodation.149 The Eleventh Circuit
explained that the disability defense raised in the eviction claim, coupled
with counsel's explanation at mediation that Mr. Rodriguez was disabled and
required an accommodation so he did not have to go up and down the stairs,
were "sufficient to allow a reasonabl[e] jury to find that Mr. Rodriguez [was
claiming a disability and that he] made a specific demand for an accommo-
dation."so Although Mr. Rodriguez did not use the term "reasonable ac-
commodation," HHA had sufficient information to know of Mr. Rodriguez's
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Hialeah Hous. Auth., 418 F. App'x at 877.
143. Id. at 875.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Hialeah Hous. Auth., 418 F. App'x at 875.
148. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Hialeah Hous. Auth., No. 08-
22679-CIV, 2010 WL 1540046, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 2010) (internal quotation marks
omitted), rev'd per curiam, 418 F. App'x 872 (11th Cir. 2011)).
149. Id. at 876, 878.
150. Id. at 877.
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disability and his desire for an accommodation.15 ' That "trigger[ed] HHA's
duty to provide a reasonable accommodation."l52 The court further stated
there were material issues of fact concerning whether HHA refused to grant
an accommodation either by an outright denial or a constructive denial.15 3
The court acknowledged that as in Hawn, if the Association is skeptical
of Mr. Rodriguez's disability they could, and should, request additional in-
formation.' The appellate court noted that there were additional issues
raised and required to be addressed on remand.'55 Notwithstanding the re-
versal of summary judgment, the appellate court recognized that the single
most critical issue had not been addressed, which could produce an identical
outcome.15' The trial court assumed Mr. Rodriguez was disabled, but never
made a finding that he satisfied the Fair Housing Act's definition of a person
with a disability.' Similarly, the appellate court agreed that HHA's asser-
tion that it had no duty to grant the requested accommodation "because the
Rodriguez family was a direct threat" to others pursuant to section 3604(f)(9)
of Title 42 of the United States Code, must also be addressed.15 1
These cases demonstrate that an association has the right to request ad-
ditional medical support from a requesting party if the association is skeptic-
al of the alleged disability and/or need for an animal.159
V. Do EMOTIONAL SUPPORT ANIMALS STILL ExIST AFTER THE REVISIONS
TO THE ADAAA?
One of the most significant changes to the ADAAA is the definition of
a "service animal." 60 This definition became effective March 11, 2011,16
and has already created quite a controversy. The revised definition of service
animal is:
[A]ny dog that is individually trained to do work or perform tasks
for the benefit of an individual with a disability, including a physi-
151. Id.
152. See Hialeah Hous. Auth., 418 F. App'x at 877.
153. See id. at 878.
154. Id. at 877 (quoting Jankowski Lee & Assocs. v. Cisneros, 91 F.3d 891, 895 (7th Cir.
1996)).
155. Id. at 878.
156. See id.
157. Hialeah Hous. Auth., 418 F. App'x at 878.
158. Id.
159. See id. at 877-78; Hawn v. Shoreline Towers Phase I Condo. Ass'n, 347 F. App'x
464, 468 (11 th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
160. Compare 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2011), with 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2010).
161. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2011).
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cal, sensory, psychiatric, intellectual, or other mental disability.
Other species of animals, whether wild or domestic, trained or un-
trained, are not service animals for the purposes of this definition.
The work or tasks performed by a service animal must be directly
related to the individual's disability. Examples of work or tasks
include, but are not limited to, assisting individuals who are blind
or have low vision with navigation and other tasks, alerting indi-
viduals who are deaf or hard of hearing to the presence of people
or sounds, providing non-violent protection or rescue work, pull-
ing a wheelchair, assisting an individual during a seizure, alerting
individuals to the presence of allergens, retrieving items such as
medicine or the telephone, providing physical support and assis-
tance with balance and stability to individuals with mobility dis-
abilities, and helping persons with psychiatric and neurological
disabilities by preventing or interrupting impulsive or destructive
behaviors. The crime deterrent effects of an animal's presence and
the provision of emotional support, well-being, comfort, or com-
panionship do not constitute work or tasks for the purposes of this
definition.' 62
This definition officially eviscerates emotional support animals, at least in
public.163 It also limits service animals to dogs,'6M and in certain circums-
tances, miniature horses,66 and requires that the animal be trained to work or
perform a task for the disabled individual.'6 Some legal commentators have
argued that this revision to the ADAAA also applies to the FHAA, and there-
fore, associations will no longer have to make accommodations to allow
emotional support animals. 67 To eliminate any confusion, HUD issued a
memorandum dated February 17, 2011,168 explaining:
This memo explains that the Department of Justice's (DOJ) recent
amendments to its Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) regula-
tions do not affect reasonable accommodation requests under the
Fair Housing Act (FHAct) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 (Section 504). The DOJ's new rules limit the defini-
tion of "service animal" in the ADA to include only dogs. The
162. Id. (emphasis added).
163. See id.
164. Id.
165. Id. § 36.302(c)(9); Memorandum from Sara K. Pratt, Deputy Assistant Sec'y for
Enforcement & Programs, to FHEO Region Dirs. 1 (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.nwfairhouse.
org/images/1300304582.pdf.
166. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104.
167. See Memorandum from Sara K. Pratt, supra note 165, at 1.
168. Id.
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new rules also define "service animal" to exclude emotional sup-
port animals. This definition, however, does not apply to the
FHAct or Section 504. Disabled individuals may request a reason-
able accommodation for assistance animals in addition to dogs, in-
cluding emotional support animals, under the FHAct or Section
504. In situations where both laws apply, housing providers must
meet the broader FHAct/Section 504 standard in deciding whether
to grant reasonable accommodation requests. 69
The purpose behind the ADAAA revisions was to prevent people from
having to dine with an emotional support potbellied pig or watch a movie
with a comfort goat. Dogs are considered to be one of the most acceptable
animals and they are easily trained.1 70 However, many other types of animals
provide these same functions.' 7' For example, many people use monkeys to
alert oncoming seizures, to help feed quadriplegics, and for various other
tasks that require fine motor skills.172 Herein lies the quandary: What will
happen when a disabled individual has a trained monkey in his or her home
to perform specific required motor skills, such as turning on a light switch,
opening a bottle or turning a door knob-things the disabled individual can
no longer do? Since the ADA prevents the disabled person from bringing his
or her service monkey to a restaurant or shopping mall, the monkey is
banned, right? 7 3 A city in California addressed this issue and chose to pass
an ordinance to continue to use the original definition of a service animal.174
169. Id. (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted).
170. See Information on Disability Service Animals for Blind and Persons with Disabili-
ties, DISABLED WORLD, http://www.disabled-world.com/disability/serviceanimals/ (last visited
Apr. 15, 2012).
171. Robert L. Adair, Note, Monkeys and Horses and Ferrets . . . Oh My! Non-
Traditional Service Animals Under the ADA, 37 N. Ky. L. REv. 415, 418-32 (2010).
172. See Helping Hands Monkey Helpers for Quadriplegics, DISABLED WORLD (Jan. 8,
2009), http://www.disabled-world.com/disability/serviceanimals/monkey-helpers.php (dis-
cussing how a national organization provides and trains monkeys to assist people with spinal
injuries and other mobility impairments); Information on Disability Service Animals for Blind
and Persons with Disabilities, supra note 170 ("Capuchin monkeys have been trained to per-
form manual tasks such as grasping items, operating knobs and switches, and turning the
pages of a book.").
173. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2011) (indirectly limiting the definition ofa "service animal"
under the ADA to a dog); Rose v. Springfield-Greene Cnty. Health Dep't, 668 F. Supp. 2d
1206, 1214 (W.D. Mo. 2009) (finding that the plaintiffs service monkey did not fall within
the definition of "a service animal under the ADA"), aff'd, 377 F. App'x 573 (8th Cir. 2010),
cert denied, 131 S. Ct. 929 (2011).
174. HESPERIA, CAL. CODE ch. 5.68 (2011); Sue Manning, Rats! Justice Department
Shoos Service Animals: Snakes, Monkeys, Cats Not Accepted Under New Guidelines, WASH.
TIMEs, Apr. 4, 2011, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011 /apr/4/rats-justice-depa
rtment-shoos-service-animals.
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This ordinance allowed a woman to continue to use her trained service rats
that detect, and alert her to, severe muscle spasms. 75 Local government has
the ability to expand the rights provided under the FHAA, but not to restrict
those rights.176 While it is unlikely she will receive the same treatment out-
side the city of Hesperia, at least for now, this woman can dine and shop in
peace with her rats. 177
This is one of the most significant examples of how the ADAAA and
FHAA appear to be deviating. Where the two Acts were once almost com-
pletely uniform in language and application," 8 they are now beginning to
deviate, at least in terms of the definitions of disabilities and service and
emotional support animals.179 These differences will most certainly produce
substantial litigation. If a monkey is permitted in a condominium as an epi-
leptic seizure alert service animal, how will the courts reconcile the fact that
the monkey is not able to accompany its owner in public? It will be interest-
ing to see how the courts deal with these types of issues.
A. Training
While the ADAAA makes clear that training of a service animal is re-
quired,'80 the case law interpreting the FHAA is unsettled. There are cases
suggesting that some form of training is required even for an emotional sup-
port animal,"' and other cases, along with HUD decisions, that suggest oth-
erwise.'82 Some courts insist that there must be some evidence of training of
the emotional support animal, either by a professional or other person, to set
the service animal apart from an ordinary pet and to establish that allowing
an animal on the premises is a necessary and reasonable accommodation.' 83
175. Manning, supra note 174.
176. 42 U.S.C. § 3615 (2006).
177. See Manning, supra note 174.
178. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 3602 (1988), with 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (1994).
179. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 3602 (2006); ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-325, § 4, 122 Stat. 3553, 3555 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006 & Supp.
112008)); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2011); Memorandum from Sara K. Pratt, supra note 165, at 1.
180. Memorandum from Sara K. Pratt, supra note 165, at 1.
181. See, e.g., Bronk v. Ineichen, 54 F.3d 425, 431-32 (7th Cir. 1995); Prindable v. Ass'n
of Apartment Owners of 2987 Kalakaua, 304 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1256-57 (D. Haw. 2003).
182. See, e.g., Overlook Mut. Homes, Inc. v. Spencer, 666 F. Supp. 2d 850, 861 (S.D.
Ohio 2009); Janush v. Charities Hous. Dev. Corp., 169 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1136 (N.D. Cal.
2000). For information regarding the HUD Decisions, see 24 C.F.R. § 5.303 (2008); Pet
Ownership for the Elderly and Persons with Disabilities, 73 Fed. Reg. 63834, 63835-36 (Oct.
27, 2008) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 5).
183. See, e.g., Bronk, 54 F.3d at 431-32; Assenberg v. Anacortes Hous. Auth., No. CO5-
1836RSL, 2006 WL 1515603, at *3 (W.D. Wash. May 25, 2006); Prindable, 304 F. Supp. 2d
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Other courts take the position that the plaintiff need not establish that the
animal has any type of training if it can be shown the animal's presence ame-
liorates the effects of the disability.'" In the case of Auburn Woods I Home-
owners Ass'n v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission,'85 the California
court stated that it is "the innate qualities of a dog, in particular a dog's
friendliness and ability to interact with humans, that ma[k]e it therapeutic"
without the need for special training.'86 Whether the animal is trained, courts
agree there must be a showing of how the animal "will affirmatively enhance
a disabled plaintiff's quality of life by ameliorating the effects of the disabili-
ty."' 87
B. Animal Certifications and Records
An association is able to request documentation concerning the pro-
posed animal to ensure that the animal does not pose a threat to other resi-
dents.'8 8 An association can request the vaccination and inoculation records
at 1256-57; Green v. Hous. Auth. of Clackamas Cnty., 994 F. Supp. 1253, 1256 (D. Or.
1998); State ex rel. Henderson v. Des Moines Mun. Hous. Agency, No. 06-1144, 2007 WL
4553350, at *5-6 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2007) (unpublished table decision); Oras v. Hous.
Auth. of the City of Bayonne, 861 A.2d 194, 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004); Storms v.
Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., 120 P.3d 126, 128-29 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005); Timberlane Mobile
Home Park v. Wash. State Human Rights Comm'n, 95 P.3d 1288, 1291 (Wash. Ct. App.
2004); In re Kenna Homes Coop. Corp., 557 S.E.2d 787, 798 (W. Va. 2001).
184. See, e.g., Spencer, 666 F. Supp. 2d at 861; Janush, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1136; Auburn
Woods I Homeowners Ass'n v. Fair Emp't & Hous. Comm'n, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 669, 682 (Ct.
App. 2004); Crossroads Apartments Assocs. v. LeBoo, 578 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1007 (Rochester
City Ct. 1991).
185. 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 669 (Ct. App. 2004).
186. Id. at 682. In a recent case in the Southern District of Florida, the Court entered an
Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, stating that although there is
conflicting case law addressing whether an emotional support animal requires any training,
this Court would follow the line of cases that provide that emotional support animals do not
require any training. Falin v. Condo. Ass'n of La Mer Estates, Inc., No. I 1-61903-CIV, 2012
WL 1910021, *3 (S.D. Fla. May 28, 2012).
187. Bronk, 54 F.3d at 429; see also Hawn v. Shoreline Towers Phase I Condo. Ass'n,
347 F. App'x 464, 468 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); Spencer, 666 F. Supp. 2d at 856 (quot-
ing Howard v. City of Beavercreek, 276 F.3d 802, 806 (6th Cir. 2002)); Prindable, 304 F.
Supp. 2d at 1256; State ex rel. Henderson, 2007 WL 4553350, at *5 (citing Edwards v. EPA,
456 F. Supp. 2d 72, 101 (D.D.C. 2006)); Oras, 861 A.2d at 203 (quoting Bronk, 54 F.3d at
429); Landmark Props. v. Olivo, 783 N.Y.S.2d 745, 748 (N.Y. App. Term 2004); In re Kenna
Homes Coop. Corp., 557 S.E.2d at 799; see Nason v. Stone Hill Realty Ass'n, No. 961591,
1996 WL 1186942, at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 6, 1996); LeBoo, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 1007.
188. Pet Ownership for the Elderly and Persons with Disabilities, 73 Fed. Reg. 63834,
63836-37 (Oct. 27, 2008) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 5).
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for the animal at the time of the initial request for accommodation and then
annually thereafter. 189
HUD states that an animal's certifications should not be requested."
However, it is these authors' opinions that in many cases, a determination of
whether the animal ameliorates the effects of a disability is dependent upon
what the animal is trained to do. Several courts have agreed with this propo-
sition also.' 9'
VI. CONCLUSION
For virtually every association, claims for reasonable accommodations
to a pet restriction or limitation can be landmines. The manner in which they
are investigated, the information requested, and the decision process are
fraught with pitfalls. Where associations once shied away from challenging
a request for an emotional support animal claimed under suspicious circums-
tances, the case law now gives the association some teeth in requesting addi-
tional medical information.19 2 Although HUD may disagree, at least the
courts have begun to acknowledge and prevent the abuses of the system that
currently plague virtually every association. 93
189. See id. Notwithstanding a disabled individual's legitimate request for an accommo-
dation to maintain an emotional support animal, the animal may not cause a nuisance. See
generally Meadowland Apartments v. Schumacher, 813 N.W.2d 618, 624-26 (S.D. 2012).
190. Pet Ownership for the Elderly and Persons with Disabilities, 73 Fed. Reg. at 63835.
191. See, e.g., Bronk, 54 F.3d at 429; Prindable, 304 F. Supp. 2d at 1256-57.
192. Hawn v. Shoreline Towers Phase I Condo. Ass'n, 347 F. App'x 464, 468 (11 th Cir.
2009) (per curiam).
193. See Roustan, supra note 9.
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